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Chapter pages in book: (p. 3 - 10)more effective appeal to history in the United States, although
the usefulness of this appeal may be doubted for two reasons.
First, the broad trend of intergovernmental relations has been
markedly similar in the two countries. Second, discovery of the
intentions of the wise men who deliberated at Philadelphia in
1787 and at Quebec in 1864 provides little direct guidance in
the solution of today's problems. At present the demand is for
a social service state; eighty or one hundred and sixty years ago
the sphere of government was narrowly viewed. This is not a
criticism of the framers of the constitutions of either country.
These men were neither prophets nor soothsayers. The proof of
their wisdom is that the constitutions they wrote have been flex-
ible enough to survive a revolution in economic and social
philosophy.
THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON DoMINION-
PROVINCIAL RELATIONS
The regional diversity of Canada is not as obvious or as marked
as that of the United States, principally because Canada has no
such variety of climatic conditions. "Economically Canada can
be compared to a string of beads, and they are not all pearls."5
More than nine out of every ten Canadians live in a discon-
tinuous belt of land, two hundred miles wide, along the Amer-
ican border.6 The Appalachians separate the maritime provinces
from Quebec; a vast V-shaped area of ancient rocks surrounding
Hudson Bay —theCanadian shield —separatesthe prairie
provinces from Ontario; the Rockies separate British Columbia
from the prairie provinces.
The ruinous incidence of the depression of the early 'thirties
upon the prairie provinces, and therefore upon the finances of
the provincial governments, was the occasion for the appoint-
ment of a Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations
in August 1937. It was to investigate the distribution of func-
tions and revenues between the Dominion and the provinces,
"and to express what in its opinion, subject to the retention of
the distribution of legislative powers essential to a proper carry-
5Reportof the Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations, Book I, p. 186.
F. R. Scott, CanadaToday(Oxford University Press, 1939), p. 5.
3ing out of the federal system in harmony with national needs
and the promotion of national unity, will best effect a balanced
relationship between the financial powers and the obligations
and functions of each governing body, and conduce to a more
efficient, independent and economical discharge of governmental
responsibilities in
The recommendations of the Royal Commission, made in
May 1940, can be summarized under reallocation of (a) gov-
ernmental functions, (b) revenues and debts. With respect to
(a), the Royal Commission was conscious of the complexities
inherent in a federal system. Some enlargement of Dominion
functions seemed desirable, but the Commission examined each
of the many suggestions to see whether there was a reasonable
uniformity of viewpoint among the provinces and whether
Dominion administration was likely to be successful. Provincial
autonomy was to be preserved without hamstringing effective
action and without entailing costs and wastes the Canadian econ-
omy could not afford.
By all odds the most important recommendation with respect
to jurisdiction was that unemployment relief,i.e.,relief for
unemployed employables as distinct from unemployables, should
be a Dominion function. Ancillary to this recommendation, the
Dominion in 1941 enacted a measure of compulsory unemploy-
ment insurance as a national scheme.
The residual responsibility for social welfare functions was
to remain with the provinces. Provision for unemployables,
widows' pensions, mothers' allowances,child welfare, public
health, health insurance, workmen's compensation should, the
Commission declared, be left under provincial jurisdiction and
be financed from provincial treasuries. So also should education.
Admittedly these services will expand in the future and admit-
tedly "it is highly desirable that every province should provide
these services in accordance with average Canadian standards ;"7a•
7Report of the Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations, Book I, p. 10.
7aIbid.,Book II, p. 44. The Commission, as a supplement to the recommendation
thatthe Dominion assumeresponsibilityforemployables,concludedthatthe
Dominion should be given jurisdiction "to establish basic minimum wages and
maximum hours of labour, and to fixtheage of employment, leaving to any province
jurisdiction to raise minimum wages, lower hours of labour, or raise the age of
employment ifit so desires." Ibid., p. 49.
4but for reasons that will appear presently the Commission was
opposed to conditional grants as a means of ensuring average
standards, and it recommended a different method of alleviating
provincial fiscal need. In the whole field of social servicesit
favored a clean-cut separation of functions and responsibilities.
Federal assumption of responsibility for employables would,
of course, lift an onerous burden from provincial shoulders.
The Commission made,in addition,three recommendations
concerning the reallocation of revenues and debts that form
part of an integrated plan:(1)transfer of certaintaxes,
(2) assumption of provincial debt, and (3) replacement of the
old unconditional subsidies by national adjustment grants.
The first concerned chiefly the personal income tax, corporation
taxes, and inheritance taxes—all of which were to be relinquished
by the provinces. The aim was to make an adjustment in the
interest of equity and efficiency; there was no question of increas-
ing the constitutional power of the Dominion, since its right
to levy these taxes is not limited. These taxes, in the opinion
of the Commission, call for an administrative unit larger than
a province; centralized control will bring greater economy and
efficiencyincollection, and most important, increase national
income. A personal income tax was being levied at this time
by six of the nine provincial governments, but in three (Ontario,
Manitoba, and Prince Edward Island) the Dominion acted as
collector, and in British Columbia alone did the definition of
taxable income differ greatly from that of the Dominion. Cor-
poration taxes were of a variety and complexity beyond belief;
they "violate every canon of sound taxation," with a growing
tendency in difficult times to victimization of exposed business.8
Death taxes have given rise to the same types of double taxation
as in the United During the 192O's reciprocal agree-
ments minimized the difficulties, but they were destroyed during
the depression. The Commission felt that even if the provinces
retained death taxes, a program of Dominion collection with
8The provinces would be permitted to levy bona fide license fees, real estate taxes,
and consumption taxes collected through corporations. On the ground that a province
isentitled to compensation for depletion ofitsnatural wealth, the Commission
recommended also that the Dominion "pay over to the province concerned 10 percent
of the corporate income derived from the exploitation of the mineral wealth of the
province" (ibid., p. 271).
5distribution of the proceeds on some agreed basis would be
\vi s e.
if these important sources of revenue were to be placed in
Dominion hands, something had to be done to compensate the
provinces. The Commission, convinced that no great shift in
functions from the provinces to the Dominion was desirable,
and disliking conditional grants, had to find some large expendi-
ture of which the provinces could be relieved if its tax transfer
recommendations were to be worth considering. As provincial
interest charges were large, in 1933 absorbing one-third and
in 1937 over one-fifth of provincial revenues, the Dominion
was to assume all provincial debts. In addition, the Commission
proposed a new system of unconditional subsidies —grants
without strings paid by the federal government to the provinces.
Canada since 1867 has had a system of unconditional subsidies.
The fathers of confederation, conscious of the dangers of such
a system, put a clause in the constitution declaring that original
subsidies were to be "in full settlement of all future demands".
The clause proved utterly ineffective: the subsidies have been
altered beyond recognition and many of the alterations have
been made because of political pressure and for political pur-
poses. Of this the Commission was well aware, and in an
amusing understatement it said: "the negotiations between the
Dominion and the provinces [about subsidies] have lacked the
candour which is desirable in a democracy".9 It recommended
the abolition of these subsidies, but believed that Canada could
start tabula rasa with a new system of subsidies—"national
adjustment grants"—which would be soundly calculated and
which it would make the balance-wheel of its whole fiscal plan.
How were these to be calculated? In essence the Commission
calculated for each province, first, the expenditure that would
be necessary if a normal Canadian standard of governmental
services was provided, and second, the revenue that would be
derived from taxation of normal severity. If the provinces were
left with a deficit, a national adjustment grant would be mdi-
9Ibid.,p. 271.See also J.A. Maxwell, Federal Subsidies to the Provincial Govern-
ments in Canada(HarvardUniversity Press, 1937), especially Chapter XIV, for a
proposal dealing with the abolition of the subsidies and federal assumption of
provincial debt. -
6cated, and the Commission declared that six provinces—Prince
Edward Island, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Quebec, Mani-
toba, and Saskatchewan—should receive grants, while three—
Ontario, Alberta, and British Columbia—should not. The grants
were to be reviewed, every five years.
Because the grants were unconditional, they would effect some
redistribution of the tax burden in favor of the poorer provinces,
wipe out the old subsidies, and put the poorer provinces in a
fiscal position enabling them to provide a normal level of govern-
mental services, especially social services. The Commission left
no doubt concerning its belief that "in the interests of national
unity itis highly desirable that every province should be able
to provide these services in accordance with average Canadian
standards".1° But actual provincial provision, or lack ofit,
was held to be no concern of the Dominion. Dominion respon-
•sibility was to end when a provincial government had been put
in a fiscal position to discharge its responsibilities.
The Commission took this attitude because of its strong belief
that any attempt on the part of the Dominion to control or
direct provincial expenditures would be incompatible with provin-
cial autonomy. And it considered autonomy important because
of "the wide differences in social philosophy and economic and
social conditions among the provinces" and because in the social
services "local, detailed and highly personal administration is
often required".'1 For certain services in which these differ-
ences were marked, the Commission was not prepared to recom-
mend even conditional grants, but for other social services,
notably unemployment insurance and old age insurance, the
Commission argued that a national standard of provision and
national administration were essential and recommended com-
plete Dominion control.
The experience of the United States would indicate that the
conditional grant is a practicable method of providing for serv-
ices that for constitutional, administrative, or financial reasons,
are neither wholly federal nor wholly provincial. The Commis-
sion believed, however, that this device called for cooperative
of the Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations, Book II.
p.44.
11ibid.,p.44.
7administration by the Dominion and the provinces. The Do-
minion, when it decides to assist the provinces in performing
a function, must not only choose the function with care;it
must also set up an adequate system of administrative super-
visiontoseethat national standards aremaintained. The
Commission was inclined to believe that both the choice and
the supervision would lead to friction and fumbling.
Certainly these difficulties are very real, and the judgment
of the Commission may be based on political realities in Canada.
Yet its judgment against joint 'occupancy' meant less likelihood
of achieving a national minimum standard for certain services.
The essential fact is, moreover, that in a federation any rea-
sonable remedy for problems of federal-provincialrelations
will face difficulties. It is not easy to reconcile the sentiment of
Quebec and Ontario against centralization with the sentiment
of the other provinces in favor of Dominion assumption of a
larger responsibility.
The two large provinces, Ontario and Quebec, which contain
respectively 33and30 percent of the population of Canada,
have always opposed centralization, although for different rea-
sons. Broadly, the opposition of Ontario grows out of economic,
and that of Quebec out of cultural, religious, and demographic
factors. Ontario is the richest province. As a governmental unit
it can provide its people with a level of services higher than
that of the other provinces while imposing taxation of less than
average severity. The federal proposals, 1941-46, were there-
fore viewed by the provincial government of Ontario asa
diminution of its financial autonomy and as a method of placing
a larger financial burden upon its residents.
The case of Quebec is more complex. In many respects Quebec
is an island which, culturally, is separate from the rest of Can-
ada. Over 77 percent of the people of French origin in Canada
reside in Quebec, and over 80 percent of its residents are of
French origin. Nearly 58percentof Canadians professing the
Roman Catholic religion reside in Quebec, and nearly 87 percent
of the residents of Quebec profess the Roman Catholic religion.
Factors such as these explain the insistence of the provincial
government of Quebec that nothing be done that might impair
provincial autonomy.
8These cultural factors partly explain why the distribution of
governmental functions in Quebec differs from that of the other
provinces, and why the level of expenditure for education and
public welfare is lower. Expenditure for education is one-quarter
less, and that for public welfare one-tenth less than in the other
provinces (Table 1). However, governmental expenditure in
Quebec is supplemented by the Roman Catholic Church more
than in the other provinces. This again indicates the unique
position of Quebec.
TABLE 1
Governmental Expenditure in Quebec and in the Other Provinces




Education 4.43 5.32 9.75 4.10 9.06 13.16
Public Welfare..5.18 3.39 8.57 6.00 3.60 9.60
With respect to other governmental functions, the burden
upon the municipalities in Quebec is relatively larger; as a result,
their debt charges per capita have been appreciably higher
than those of municipal governments in the rest of Canada. For
1942 net debt charges of the municipal governments of Quebec
were $5.09 per capita; those of municipal governments else-
where, $2.80 per capita.
In terms of economic strength, Quebec is not on an equality
with Ontario. The Royal Commission calculated the per capita
income paid to individuals in 1937 to be $345 for Canada as
a whole, $438 for Ontario, and $299 for Quebec. Moreover,
the distribution of income in Quebec is significantly out of line
at the top and bottom of the scale. The aggregate income in
1942 received by recipients in the $25,000 and over group was
3.9 percent of the total for Quebec, and only 2.3 percent for
the rest of Canada (Table 2). The aggregate income received
by the under $1,000 group was 18.8 percent for Quebec, and
only 15.9 percent for the rest of Canada.
9TABLE 2
Percentage Distribution of Aggregate Income, 1942, by Income Groups,
excluding Agriculture and the Armed Services
Quebec OntarioCanada except Quebec
Under $1,000 18.8 14.3 15.9
1,000—2,000 38.3 41.7 40.6
2,000—5,000 27.7 30.9 30.8
5,000—10,000 6.5 6.2 6.3 -
10,000—25,000 4.8 4.2 4.1
Over 25,000 3.9 2.7 2.3
100.0 100.0 100.0
Dominion Bureau of Statistics, National Accounts, Income and Expenditure, 1938-
7945 (King's Printer, Ottawa, 1946), pp. 40, 42, and 36.
Factors of this sort, consciously or unconsciously, influenced
the attitude of the Commission. In addition, the political history
of the Liberal Party in Canada has been dominated by an aware-
ness of Quebec. The present Prime Minister, Mackenzie King,
has an innate appreciation of thesignificance of provincial
autonomy and has taken an uncompromising position against
conditional subsidies.12
DOMINION-PROVINCIAL CONFERENCE, 1941
The Commission did not conclude its deliberations until after
Canada had entered the war, and the federal government had
to consider whether it should call a Dominion-provincial confer-
ence to deal with the Report. As the Report looked toward
long-term revision of Dominion-provincial relations, to consider
it in wartime might seem inappropriate. On the other hand, the
war was certain to aggravate and magnify certain defects of
existing Dominion-provincial arrangements. To maximize the
war effort of Canada, the federal government would have to
levy high rates of income tax, to invade fields of revenue occu-
pied by the provinces,torationgasoline, thereby reducing
provincial revenues. No question of its constitutional rights to
-take such steps as war measures could be raised, but the provin-
-cial government might financially be left in the lurch. A Confer-
ence to work out methods of alleviating provincial embarrass-
ments seemed advisable. Accordingly, on November 2, 1940,
Prime Minister King sent a letter asking the provincial govern-
:12SeeJ. A. Maxwell, op. cit., pp. 25 3-6.
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